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APPLYING THE KOREAN EXPERIENCE WITH 
ANTITRUST LAW TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
COMPETITION LAW IN CHINA† 
PROFESSOR OHSEUNG KWON, PH.D.∗ 
I. PREFACE 
Economic systems can be divided into market economies and planned 
economies on the basis of the mechanisms by which they coordinate the 
economic activities of individual economic actors. China has recently 
adopted the market economy, common in most western countries and 
Korea. China has had roughly ten years of experience with a market 
economy, but the Chinese have yet to adopt antitrust legislation.1 Korea, 
on the other hand, already has more than fifty years of experience with this 
kind of system and more than twenty years of experience with antitrust 
law, which began in 1981 with the enactment of the Monopoly Regulation 
and Fair Trade Act (the Korean Antitrust Act, hereinafter “KAA” or “the 
Act”). The KAA was meant to ensure free competition and fair trade in 
Korean markets.  
This Essay first focuses on the process of the enactment and 
development of Korean antitrust law, and then provides an overview of the 
objectives, substantive contents, structure, and function of the KAA’s 
enforcement agencies and enforcement procedures. Next, this Essay 
proposes an analysis of the root cause of the KAA’s lack of success in 
transforming the monopolistic or oligopolistic market structure into a more 
competitive one, and suggests some ideas for revising the KAA. Finally, 
this Essay proffers lessons from the Korean experience for China. 
II. ENACTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF KOREAN ANTITRUST LAW 
Although the Constitution of the Republic of Korea promotes the 
principles of a market economy as the core of its economic order, the 
economic activities of individual agents have continuously been plagued 
 
 
 † Due to circumstances beyond this Law Review’s control, we have relied on the integrity of 
the Author for all Korean language sources cited herein and asserted facts that are not supported by a 
citation.  
 ∗ College of Law, Seoul National University. 
 1. Xiaoye Wang, The Prospect of the Anti-Monopoly Legislation in China, 1 WASH. U. 
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 201 (2002). 
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by government intervention. This problem results primarily from the fact 
that the Korean government, through a series of economic development 
plans beginning in the 1960s, endeavored to overcome structural 
weaknesses and to reduce economic dependency on other countries by 
implementing an export-oriented economic development policy. In order 
to accomplish these goals, the government relied heavily on a handful of 
large-scale enterprises, and the government supported these enterprises 
through many aspects of its economic policy, including tax exemptions 
and a favorable distribution of bank loans. At the same time, the Korean 
government itself played a significant role, directly or indirectly, in 
developing key industries and the overall economic infrastructure. 
While the early 1980s marked the emergence of Korea as a newly 
developed nation, government policies resulted in monopolistic domestic 
markets and allowed only a small number of large-scale enterprises to 
control most of the nation’s key industries. The ramifications of these 
policies for the economy were numerous and diverse. First, economic 
power became concentrated in the hands of a few large-scale businesses 
and business conglomerates favored by the government during its export-
driven development years. Second, the Korean government’s excessive 
market intervention and regulation greatly impaired the functioning of the 
market. To cope with these problems and restore proper market function, 
the government enacted the KAA to promote free competition and fair 
trade by prohibiting the abuse of market-dominant positions, anti-
competitive mergers, unreasonable cartels, and unfair trade practices. In 
addition, the KAA was an attempt to simultaneously deregulate many 
important industries. In 1986, the KAA was amended to introduce new 
provisions aimed at reducing excessive concentrations of economic power 
through heavier regulation of large-scale business conglomerates and 
holding companies.2 
III. OVERVIEW OF THE KAA 
A. The Objectives of the KAA  
The primary objective of the KAA is to promote free competition and 
fair trade.3 Because market economies cannot work efficiently without free 
 
 
 2. KAA has already been amended 22 times since it became effective in 1981 (the list of 
amendments is available at the beginning of the Act). Statutes of the Republic of Korea, Dokjummit 
Gongjung Gurae Gwanhan Popryul [hereinafter “Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act”], Vol. 8 
(1997).  
 3. Article 1 of the KAA distinguishes its more immediate goal (encouragement of fair and free 
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competition and fair trade between individual economic agents, the KAA 
is truly the fundamental law of economic order in Korea. The first 
amendment to the KAA, made in 1986, was specifically aimed at reducing 
the concentration of economic power.4  
B. Substantive Components of the KAA 
The substantive components of the KAA can be divided into three 
categories on the basis of the objectives each seeks to achieve: (1) 
regulations to promote and ensure free competition; (2) regulations to 
ensure fair trade; and (3) regulations to reduce the concentration of 
economic power. 
1. Regulations to Promote and Ensure Free Competition 
In order to promote and ensure free competition in the market, the 
KAA regulates economic agents and activities that could undermine 
conditions of free competition, such as monopolies, oligopolies, mergers, 
and collaborative activities and cartels. With regard to monopolies and 
oligopolies, the KAA does not explicitly prohibit the possession or 
acquisition of this sort of power, instead, it forbids the abuse of a market-
dominant position. In other words, the KAA restricts anti-competitive or 
unfair behavior of market-dominant firms, rather than prohibiting 
monopolization or attempts to establish a monopoly.  
As it is difficult to assess whether a firm possesses a market-dominant 
position or not, the KAA includes a presumptive clause that considers a 
firm to be market-dominant if it meets the conditions stated in Article 
Four.5 The KAA, as amended in 1996, requires that the Fair Trade 
Commission (hereinafter the “KFTC” or the “Commission”) establish and 
enforce measures designed to promote competition in markets where 
monopolies and oligopolies have long been entrenched. Korean economic 
 
 
economic competition) from its ultimate goals (stimulating creative business activities, protecting 
consumers, and promoting the balanced development of the national economy) by stating that, “The 
purpose of this Act is to encourage fair and free economic competition by prohibiting the abuse of 
market-dominant positions and the excessive concentration of economic power and by regulating 
improper concerted acts and unfair business practices, thereby stimulating creative business activities, 
protecting consumers, and promoting the balanced development of the national economy.” Id. art. 1. 
 4. Act No. 3895 (July 24, 1986). Whether or not the revision that added regulating 
concentration of economic power as a legislative goal is appropriate is still a subject of great debate.  
 5. If the market share of one enterprise is greater than fifty percent or the combined market 
share of less than three enterprises is above 75 percent, excluding any enterprise with a market share of 
less than 10 percent, then the firm is considered market-dominant. Monopoly Regulation and Fair 
Trade Act, art. 4(1)-(2) (Korea). 
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policy reflects a clear understanding that it is impossible to render a 
market more competitive simply by forbidding the abuse of a market-
dominant position.6 
As for mergers, the KAA prohibits those that would substantially 
restrict competition in any relevant market,7 while allowing mergers as an 
exception when the efficiency-enhancing effects of a merger far exceed 
the potential harms of restrained competition, or when the merger involves 
an enterprise for which the paid-in-capital was less than the total assets on 
the balance sheet for a considerable period of time, thus deeming its 
revitalization impossible.8 Recognizing the difficulty of determining 
whether a merger substantially restrains competition or not, the KAA’s 
1996 amendment added a presumptive clause that made certain mergers9 
presumptively illegal.10 The KAA also prohibits mergers by means of 
compulsion or any other unfair measure.11 Whether this clause is well 
suited to the purpose of the KAA, however, remains questionable. 
The KAA basically prohibits collaborative activities and cartels that 
unreasonably restrict competition. Cartels, however, may be permitted if 
deemed necessary for achieving certain desirable ends, including: (1) 
industrial rationalization; (2) promotion of research and technological 
development; (3) resolution of economic depression; (4) promotion of 
industrial restructuring; (5) rationalization of terms of trade; and (6) 
 
 
 6. Id. art 3. 
 7. Id. art. 7(1). 
 8. Id. art. 7(2). 
 9. The KAA presumes that competition is in effect suppressed in a particular business area if a 
business combination falls under either of two categories. The first category includes situations where 
the total market share (meaning the sum of the market shares of all affiliates) of the parties to the 
business combination meets all of the following categories:  
(a) the combined market share meets the criteria for a market-dominant enterprise; (b) the 
total market share is the highest in the business area concerned; and (c) the difference 
between the total market share and the market share of the corporation with the second 
highest market share (the corporation with the highest market share, excluding the 
corporation that is a party to the combination of enterprises is more than 25 percent of 
the said sum of market share.  
Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, art. 7(4)(1) (Korea).  
 The second category includes business combinations by large-scale corporations, either directly or 
through a specially-related person, in the following categories:  
(a) business combination in an area of trade where the market share of the small-and-medium 
enterprises is more than two-thirds pursuant to the Framework Act on Small and Medium 
Enterprises; and  
(b) acquisition of more than 5 percent of the market share as a result of said business 
combination. 
Id. 
 10. Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, art. 7(4) (Korea). 
 11. Id. art. 7(3). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss2/9
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strengthening of the competitiveness of small- and medium-sized 
businesses.12 As proof of a meeting of the minds is both crucial and 
difficult in these cases, the KAA provides that when two or more 
enterprises commit any of the acts listed in Article 19(1), the parties shall 
be presumed to be a cartel, and, therefore, substantially restraining 
competition (despite the absence of an explicit agreement to engage in 
such an act).13 
2. Regulations to Ensure Fair Trade 
The KAA prohibits various anti-competitive methods and unfair trade 
practices under the rubric of “unfair business practices” in order to 
maintain fair competition and trade. The Act thereby forbids enterprises 
from engaging in any act listed under Article 23(1) that is likely to impede 
fair competition and/or trade or to cause affiliated corporations or other 
enterprises to commit such an act. In order to effectively prohibit these 
“unfair trades or practices,” the types of, and criteria for, such trades or 
practices are clearly set forth by presidential decree.14 
The KAA also prohibits enterprises from engaging in any act that 
might hamper fair trade or restrain competition,15 and outlaws any act that 
can be considered as resale price maintenance.16 However, certain resale 
price maintenance is allowed. Exceptions include situations where the 
actions are deemed justifiable,17 and those actions regarding publications 
specified in the Presidential Decree, or commodities meeting all of Article 
29(2)’s conditions and that the KFTC has designated in advance as being 
eligible for Resale Price Maintenance.18 Additionally, the KAA prohibits 
enterprises or trade associations from entering into international 
agreements or contracts that provide for acts constituting unreasonable 
restraints of competition, unfair trade or business practices, or resale price 
maintenance. However, should the KFTC determine that the effect of the 
agreement upon competition in a relevant market is negligible or that there 
are other unavoidable reasons for the contract, such contracts may be 
permitted.19  
 
 
 12. Id. art. 19(2). 
 13. Id. art. 19(5). 
 14. Id. art. 23(2), 36. 
 15. Id. art. 26. 
 16. Id. art. 29(1) (saving clause). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. art. 29(2). 
 19. Id. art. 32. 
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3. Regulations to Reduce the Concentration of Economic Power 
The KAA controls holding companies and activities between 
subsidiaries belonging to large business groups in order to reduce the 
concentration of economic power. Its mechanisms of control include 
regulation of cross shareholdings, total amount of equity investment, debt 
guarantees for affiliated corporations, and anti-competitive subsidies. 
The establishment of holding companies was prohibited in 1987, but 
has been allowed since 1999 in order to encourage company 
restructuring.20 There are still, however, stringent restrictions on the 
establishment of holding companies because they can easily become a 
means to concentrate economic power.21  
The KAA first defines “Chaebol” as large business groups,22 and then 
establishes control over those groups that fit the criteria provided therein.23 
Subsidiaries belonging to these business groups are subject to the strict 
regulations provided in the KAA, including the prohibition of cross 
shareholdings24 and debt guarantees for affiliated corporations,25 and 
limitations on the total amount of equity investment, currently set at 
twenty-five percent.26 In addition, improper subsidies and other forms of 
 
 
 20. Id. art. 8. 
 21. Id. art. 8(2)-(3). 
 22. This approach is very similar to that of the Japanese Antitrust Act, however it ignores the 
fundamental difference between Korean Chaebol and Japanese Keirestu. While the former is actually 
controlled by one individual or his close family members, the latter is not. If then, Korea takes this 
approach, it would overlook issues specific to Chaebol, such as concentration of equity ownership and 
its resultant management inefficiencies. 
 23. The Fair Trade Commission shall designate corporations as belonging to large enterprise 
groups, subject to limitations on debt guarantees, in accordance with procedures established by 
Presidential Decree, and shall notify such companies of their membership in this group. See Monopoly 
Regulation and Fair Trade Act, art. 14(1) (Korea). 
 24. These restrictions will not apply to: a merger of companies, or the acquisition by transfer of a 
whole business; or execution of security rights or receipt of accord and satisfaction Id. art. 9(1). 
 25. Limitations on debt guarantees for affiliated corporations were first adopted in the third 
revision of the Act in 1992. Originally, the limitation was two hundred percent of the company’s net 
worth, however by 1996, this figure was reduced to one hundred percent. In 1998, to accommodate the 
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) demand for the complete removal of debt guarantees between 
affiliated corporations, the KAA was amended to prohibit any new debt guarantees and mandated 
complete removal of any existing debt guarantees by March 31, 2000. See generally id. art. 8(3). 
 26. Limitations on equity investment were first implemented in 1987. These limitations were 
lifted by revisions made in 1998 during the so-called “IMF-era” because it was thought that the 
limitations might hinder company restructuring plans. Ultimately, however, the amendment resulted in 
a dramatic increase in the amount of equity investment between subsidiaries of large-scale business 
groups, was used to reduce debt ratios on paper without any actual increase in the net worth, and to 
gain control of subsidiaries without acquiring additional shares. In response, the limitations were re-
adopted in the amendments of December 1999, and came into effect in April 2001. 
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subsidiary support that could hamper fair trade and competition are 
prohibited.27 
C. Enforcement of the Act  
1. The Fair Trade Commission 
The KAA is enforced by the Fair Trade Commission, a quasi-judicial 
regulatory agency. The KFTC is composed of nine commissioners, 
including a chairman, a vice-chairman, three standing, and four non-
standing commissioners.28 The Commission’s jurisdiction encompasses 
virtually all antitrust enforcement in Korea. It investigates suspected 
violations29 and, when a violation of the Act is found, the KFTC issues 
corrective measures and attempts to ensure violator compliance with such 
measures; if necessary, surcharges are imposed, and criminal prosecution 
is pursued against the violator. Any party that wishes to claim damages 
resulting from a violation of the KAA may bring a private suit against the 
violator after the Commission’s corrective measures become definite and 
final. Furthermore, the public prosecutor may indict the violator for 
violations of the Act. 
A Secretariat within the Commission is responsible for the day-to-day 
business of the Commission,30 and consists of a secretary general, six 
bureaus, and four regional offices.31 
 
 
 27. As a result of the KFTC’s “Guidelines on Unfair Trade Practices by Large Business Groups” 
formulated in July 1992, the Fair Trade Commission began to expand its supervision over indirect 
anti-competitive activities between subsidiaries. These activities took many forms, including the 
trading of goods and services at extremely favorable terms, however, the Commission’s supervision 
was limited by its inability to supervise more direct violations such as the provision of other 
subsidiaries with temporary payments, loans, manpower, and real estate. The amendments of 1996 
established a legal basis for Commission authority to supervise all anti-competitive activities and, in 
July 1997, the Commission formulated the “Guidelines on Anti-Competitive Transactions between 
Subsidiaries Belonging to Large Business Groups” in order to ensure “the fairness and transparency of 
its enforcement.” In addition, the 1999 amendments to the Act granted the Commission authority to 
request information regarding financial transactions in order to effectively investigate possible 
violations of anti-competition laws. 
 28. Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, art. 37(1) (Korea). 
 29. According to the KAA, any person who deems that a violation of the Act has occurred or is 
occurring, may report it to the Fair Trade Commission. Id. art. 49(2). 
 30. Id. art. 47. 
 31. Presidential Decree 16725. 
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2. Administrative Procedures 
The enforcement procedures set forth in the KAA include the 
investigation of suspected violations, the ability to order or recommend 
corrective measures, and the power to impose surcharges.32  
Under the KAA, anyone who discovers a violation may report it to the 
Commission, and the Commission may then conduct an investigation on 
its own authority.33 An injured party, however, has no legal right to require 
the Commission to undertake an investigation. Investigations are generally 
conducted by the Secretariat through authority delegated by the 
Commission. If it is deemed necessary, designated staff members of the 
Secretariat may take appropriate measures to collect information, examine 
materials at the suspected violator’s place of business, or summon the 
parties for an investigative hearing. 
When the Commission determines that there has been a violation, 
under certain circumstances, the Commission may simply recommend that 
the violator comply with specified corrective measures. The violator must 
notify the Commission of its intentions to comply with the suggested 
measures, and if it does, corrective measures pursuant to the KAA are a 
sufficient remedy. In cases where the alleged violator does not agree to 
take voluntary action, the Commission makes a final enforcement decision 
after giving the alleged violator and any interested third parties an 
opportunity to present their opinions. The final decision may include an 
administrative order for correction of the illegal conduct, a surcharge, or a 
criminal prosecution. Corrective orders include, among others, cease-and-
desist orders, orders to lower prices, and public acknowledgment of the 
violations. Surcharges can be imposed on those who violate most of the 
substantive provisions of the KAA. In imposing surcharges, the 
Commission must take into account the nature and extent of a violation, 
the duration and frequency of that violation, and the amount of benefit 
accrued as a result.34 
Interested parties may appeal the Commission’s decisions to the Seoul 
High Court under Articles 54 and 55, and ultimately, to the Supreme 
Court.  
 
 
 32. The Fair Trade Commission may impose compulsory enforcement charges instead of 
surcharge upon those who breach provisions pertaining to the restriction of business combinations. 
Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, art. 17(3) (Korea). 
 33. Id. art. 49. 
 34. Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, art. 55(3) (Korea). 
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3. Private Actions 
A party who is damaged by a violation of the KAA can bring a private 
suit against the violators for damages only after corrective measures 
ordered by the Commission have become definite and final. Under the 
Act, then, no private suit may be pressed unless a Commission 
investigation takes place, and results in the issuance of corrective 
measures for the violation. Unlike general suits for damages, there is no 
need for a plaintiff to prove intent or negligence by the defendant.35 
Private parties are authorized to bring suits for damages arising out of a 
tort independent of private actions pursuant to the provisions of the KAA.  
4. Criminal Prosecution  
In general, violations of the substantive provisions of the KAA and 
failure to comply with resulting corrective measures are punishable by 
imprisonment of up to two years or fines not to exceed one hundred fifty 
million Won.36 Criminal prosecution may not be advanced until the 
Commission has filed a complaint. 
IV. ASSESSMENT OF THE ACT AND SUGGESTIONS FOR REVISION  
A. Assessment on the Effectiveness of the Act 
Since 1981, the enforcement of the KAA has contributed greatly to the 
importance acceded to fair trade and free competition in the market and to 
public opinion, as well as to lessening anti-competitive or unfair trade 
practices. The Act, however, is not free from criticism—especially from 
academic and business circles. In general, it is argued that the Act cannot 
fully succeed in converting a monopolistic or oligopolistic market 
structure into a competitive one, and does not effectively reduce the 
concentration of economic power.37 
 
 
 35. Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, art. 56 (Korea).  
 36. Id. art. 67. 
 37. Yang Myong Cho, Assessment and Perspective of Korean Antitrust Law, J. COMPETITION L. 
12 (2002). 
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B. The Reason for Shortage in Reforming Market Structure 
We begin with the reason behind the KAA’s failure to reform the 
market structure. First, the KAA is inherently flawed. Generally speaking, 
monopolization or oligopolization occurs when a fraction of existing 
competitors succeed in gaining a controlling share of the market through 
technological advancement or capital accumulation. In Korea, however, 
the government is partly responsible for incidents of monopolization as it 
was the government that created a number of monopolies through the 
favors it bestowed upon a few large-scale enterprises during the process of 
economic development. Moreover, while the United States has developed 
antitrust laws to prevent markets from becoming monopolized or 
oligopolized, the Korean government did not institute its own antitrust 
legislation until monopolization had permeated most domestic markets. 
The KAA, therefore, faced serious obstacles from the very beginning.  
Second, the KAA might have been more effective had the government 
rigorously enforced the KAA by regulating abuses of market power. 
Unfortunately, this did not happen. This becomes very clear when we 
compare the Korean experience with the implementation of antitrust 
legislation in Germany—a system that took a very similar approach to 
antitrust regulation as that of Korea. If we reflect on the past practices of 
the KFTC, we see that the Commission was not terribly aggressive in its 
regulation of monopolies, mergers, and collaborative activities until at 
least 1997. 
C. The Reason for Failure in Reducing Concentration of Economic Power 
There are many explanations for the KAA’s failure to reduce the 
concentration of economic power. The most persuasive reason is that the 
KAA, in its current state, is inherently incapable of bringing about the 
desired reduction of concentration in economic power. To regulate the 
concentration of economic power effectively, careful study of the causes 
of concentration, and the appropriate measures for reducing or alleviating 
the concentration should have been conducted before the KAA was 
drafted. As a result of this failure, only a few means of accumulating 
economic power, such as establishment of holding companies, cross 
shareholdings, and debt guarantees for affiliated corporations, were 
prohibited or regulated. Because the KAA has not adopted any provisions 
regarding the dissolution of existing concentrations, the KAA may be 
useful in preventing greater concentration of economic power, however, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss2/9
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current measures provided by the KAA cannot be expected to alleviate or 
resolve the concentration of economic power problem itself. 
Another sharp criticism of the current KAA regulatory regime is that 
its measures are at odds with the primary aim of the legislation of ensuring 
and encouraging free competition and fair trade in the market. In other 
words, before regulating activities such as the establishment of holding 
companies, cross shareholdings, total amount of equity investment, and 
debt guarantees for affiliated corporations, there must be some explanation 
as to why these activities are harmful to free competition and fair trade. 
The KAA itself provides us with no justification for its regulations and, as 
a result, businesses are often skeptical of the KAA’s regulations. 
D. Legislative Suggestions to Improve the Korean Antitrust Act 38 
For the Act to work more efficiently as the fundamental law of a 
Korean market economy, a number of revisions are suggested herein. 
These recommendations are grouped according to the substantive, agency-
wide enforcement, and procedural aspects of the Act. 
1. Substantive Aspects of the Act 
First, the KAA’s criteria for determining whether a company has a 
market-dominant position are far too generous. Indeed, even those with 
market-dominant power are, in fact, seldom regulated. Hence, in order to 
make the KAA more practically efficient, the presumptive criteria should 
be as stringent as comparable German law.39  
Second, the KAA’s prohibitive criteria regarding mergers are set so 
high that they are virtually useless in practice. In order to enhance the 
efficiency of merger control, the criteria regarding horizontal mergers 
should be revised in a manner that has greater practical effect.40 
 
 
 38. For more information on suggested legislative amendments of Korean Antitrust Law, see 
Ohseung Kwon, Suggestion to Amend Korean Antitrust Law, 41 SEOUL NAT’L U. L.J. 122 (2000). 
 39. The German Antitrust Law presumes enterprise to be market-dominant when the combined 
market share of three or fewer enterprises reaches 50 percent, or when the combined market-share of 
five or fewer enterprises reaches two-thirds. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen [Law Against 
Restraints of Competition] v.27.7.1957 (BGB1IS.1085). 
 40. In my opinion, if we are to presume anti-competitiveness on the basis of market share, it is 
better to choose a standard of selective criteria rather than the cumulative approach taken by current 
legislation. For example, current legislation presumes that enterprise is market-dominant if: (a) it has a 
combined market-share that meets the criteria set forth by the presumptive clause; and (b) it has a 
combined market share that is the biggest in the market and exceeds the second largest enterprise by 
more than twenty-five percent of market share. 
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Additionally, new provisions designed specifically to control 
conglomerate mergers should be introduced.41 
Furthermore, while the KAA lists eight types of restricted anti-
competitive cartels, this legislative approach does not provide for the new 
types of cartels that will inevitably arise with changes in the market and in 
sales techniques. From a practical standpoint, the KAA should add an 
inclusive clause of a general nature regarding restricted anti-competitive 
cartels, rather than trying to define and list different specific types of 
cartels. 
In addition, while the KAA includes provisions regarding a meeting of 
the minds in cartel regulation, its provisions are written in such broad and 
unreasonable terms that it is of little practical use in regulating cartels. 
Legislation should be introduced to revise the KAA in a manner that 
allows for more effective control over concerted actions.  
Finally, the KAA lists seven types of unfair trade or business practices. 
The KAA states that the types of and criteria for such practices shall be 
determined by Presidential Decree. The problem with this approach, 
however, is that subjecting a violator to criminal charges when the 
elements of that crime are determined by presidential decree is that it may 
conflict with the principle of nulla poena sine lege. This approach may 
also render the Act ineffective in terms of regulating new types of unfair 
trade or business practices. In order to effectively regulate various unfair 
trade or business practices, it would be wiser to retain only the general 
provision in the KAA that prohibits unfair trade or business practices, 
thereby allowing the specific types of outlawed practices to be decided by 
the Commission or the Court. Further, the provisions pertaining to 
restriction of international contracts, resale price maintenance, or trade 
associations should be deleted—there is simply no reason to regulate these 
things separately. 
2. Enforcing the Agency-wide Aspects of the Act 
The KFTC is a quasi-judicial administrative agency in charge of the 
adjudication and development of antitrust policy. However, the 
Commission’s current structure is not sufficiently organized effectively to 
 
 
 41. The current KAA presumes anti-competitiveness only in the case of a large-scale enterprise 
entering into a new market previously inhabited by only small- to medium-sized enterprises. In order 
to make the Act more effective in controlling conglomerate mergers, it is necessary to introduce 
provisions that would presume anti-competitiveness even where there is a merger of large-scale 
enterprises, a merger of a large-scale enterprise’s subsidiaries, or a subsidiary of a large-scale 
enterprise’s acquisition of other enterprises. 
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execute its judicial functions. The Commission should be reorganized in a 
manner that strengthens its autonomy and enhances its expertise. More 
precisely, the Commission should be divided into two separate parts, with 
one division taking charge of judicial decisions and the other handling the 
creation of the Nation’s competition policy. Ideally, as with the German 
Bundeskartellamt,42 the judicial division would be further divided between 
seven and nine subdivisions, each responsible for a different industrial 
sector. Each subdivision would be led by a commissioner, who would be 
aided by a division chairman43 and two assistant officers. The policy-
making branch should be strictly limited to implementing long-term 
competition policies, repealing anti-competitive statutes, and seeking 
cooperation with related organizations at home and abroad. For the 
Commission’s two divisions to perform optimally, the Commission as a 
whole should be staffed by lawyers and economists with expertise and 
experience in antitrust law and industrial organization. 
3. Procedural Aspects of the KAA 
Public enforcement of the KAA is primarily the responsibility of the 
Commission because the Commission analyzes and assesses market 
structure and performance—a process necessary for a determination of 
whether a certain business practice is illegal or not. This is especially true 
in cases where there has been abuse of a market-dominant position or an 
anti-competitive merger. This same sort of detailed analysis and 
assessment is not, however, required in cases involving unfair trade 
practices or hardcore cartels. This is because the legality of these actions is 
relatively easy to determine. The Commission should, therefore, 
concentrate its resources on controlling the abuse of market-dominant 
positions or anti-competitive mergers rather than on unfair trade practices 
or hardcore cartels. Because unfair trade practices and hardcore cartels can 
be more efficiently controlled through private enforcement or criminal 
procedure, limitations on these current methods should be dismissed, and 
new legal procedures such as injunctions and class actions should be made 
available.  
 
 
 42. For more information on the structure of the Federal Cartel Office of Germany, see Ohseung 
Kwon, A Study on Merger Control, BUBMOONSA 85 (1987). 
 43. In this case, all commissioners of the Commission should be converted into standing 
members. 
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V. LESSONS FOR CHINA FROM THE KOREAN EXPERIENCE 
It is very encouraging that the Chinese government has finally decided 
to adopt a system of antitrust laws as a part of its transition from a planned 
economy to a market economy. This Author sincerely hopes that China’s 
efforts will yield beneficial results and suggests that China learn a great 
deal from Korea’s experience with antitrust law. After an examination of 
international economic development, one finds that while the United 
States and numerous European nations enacted antitrust legislation during 
the early stages of monopolization in order to prevent monopolistic or 
oligopolistic behavior in Korea and China, antitrust legislation is viewed 
more as a means of facilitating economic transition; Korea’s antitrust 
legislation assisted the nation in its transition from a government-oriented 
economy into a market-oriented economy during the 1980s. Also, today, 
China is instituting antitrust legislation to aid its own transition from 
planned economy to market economy. It appears that the only difference 
between the two countries is that while Korean legislation was aimed at 
regulating monopolization and oligopolization caused by natural economic 
development policies, China’s legislation will regulate the government’s 
monopoly established under the old socialist regime.  
Although China is trying to control monopolization or oligopolization 
as part of the transformation of its highly monopolized market structure, it 
must adopt an abuse-control system rather than the cause-control system 
of monopolization adopted in Korea; imposition of a cause-control system 
in China could seriously threaten the functioning of the entire domestic 
economy, despite the fact that the abuse-control system is somewhat less 
effective in reforming the market structure. Many years have elapsed since 
the KFTC began monitoring the abuse of market-dominant positions, 
however monopolistic and oligopolistic market structures are still very 
much intact. The Chinese should take the Korean experience into account 
as they adopt an abuse control system in order to prevent repetition of 
Korea’s mistakes. 
When antitrust laws were adopted as a means of economic transition in 
countries where the government had exercised tremendous control over 
the national economy, law enforcement agencies have found it difficult to 
perform their duties free from governmental influence or interferences. 
These countries also tend to lack native experts with sufficient 
professional knowledge or experience in competition law and industrial 
organization. Some critics have charged that the dearth of autonomy and 
expertise in the KFTC is the primary reason for the Act’s insufficient 
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performance. China must take care to secure its system’s autonomy, and to 
recruit properly qualified experts for its enforcement agency.  
Finally, the opportunities for criminal prosecution and private litigation 
under the Chinese system should be expanded; prosecutors and private 
individuals should be allowed to participate in enforcing the law; and the 
system itself should include a set of legal procedures, such as injunctions 
and class actions that encourage this private enforcement. 
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